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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the role of both emotional and 
metaphorical processes in reasoning. The aim of the paper is 
to present an extension of the argumentative theory of 
reasoning proposed by Mercier and Sperber (2011). In order 
to advance an integrated model of the roles of metaphors and 
emotions in argumentation, the paper argues that it is possible 
to ascribe not only a negative role to emotions and metaphors, 
but also a positive one. Far from being just a source of 
fallacies in reasoning, indeed, both emotions and metaphors – 
considered as framing and reframing strategies – can play a 
constructive role in argumentation, by enhancing their 
creative power. 
Keywords: argumentation; reasoning; deliberation; framing 
strategies; metaphors; emotions 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the ideas developed within the framework 
of embodied cognition have strongly influenced the 
understanding of the nature of reasoning and 
communication. The idea of language and reasoning as 
logic-formal systems processing abstract symbols has 
undergone strong criticism coming from cognitive 
linguistics and psychology of reasoning, which seems to be 
a real point of no return (Evans & Frankish, 2009; Gola, 
2005; Kahnemann, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
In this framework, we analyse the role of both emotional 
and metaphorical processes in reasoning. Indeed both of 
them have unexpectedly and unjustly played an entirely 
negligible role in contemporary models of reasoning, 
because of a methodological problem, as well as a more 
interesting conceptual problem. From a methodological 
point of view, the elusive (but omnipresent) nature of 
metaphors and emotions makes it difficult to build rigorous 
experimental paradigms. From a conceptual point of view, 
the missed acknowledgement of the creative role of 
metaphors and emotions can be ascribed to some erroneous 
presuppositions on the way of understanding the nature of 
reasoning and rationality, which are still lasting even within 
the embodied paradigm. 
In the first part of the paper, we consider the theory of 
dual systems as the contemporary reference paradigm for 
the study of reasoning (Evans & Frankish, 2009) and we 
present an alternative model, by adopting the argumentative 
theory of reasoning proposed by Mercier and Sperber 
(2011) as a starting point. In the second part of the paper, 
we propose an extension of their theory by considering 
emotions and metaphors as framing and reframing strategies 
(Walton & Macagno, 2015). We advance the hypothesis that 
metaphors and emotions could contribute to reasoning in an 
effective way. 
The argumentative theory of reasoning 
In this section, we use the framework of dual-processing 
models as a magnifying glass to understand how the notion 
of rationality is affected by the distinction between 
intuitions and reasoning processes. Stanovich and West 
(2000) named these two inferential processes System 1 and 
System 2. The crux of this distinction lies on automatic vs. 
controlled processes: System 1 includes rapid, associative 
and emotional processes that work in a parallel, effortless 
and unconscious way; System 2 includes slow, rule-
governed and neutral processes that work in a serial, 
effortful and often conscious way (see for example 
Kahnemann, 2003; Evans, 2008; Evans & Frankish, 2009). 
The relationship between intuitive and rational processes 
presupposed within this theory, is still largely understood in 
terms of opposition or conflict between unconscious and 
automatic processes, and conscious and controlled 
processes. In this view, (1) the role of embodiment is 
acknowledged only in intuitive processes, while (2) rational 
processes still deserve a superior function of control and 
revision. Even though reduced and limited to the activity of 
intuitive processes, such a function still implies some 
autonomy and independence of rationality from body (for an 
interesting alternative, cf. Carruthers, 2011; Fletcher & 
Carruthers, 2012).  
By stressing the conflict between the System 1 and the 
System 2, this family of dual-processing models can be 
described as competitive models. As also noted by Marraffa 
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(2014), in some cases these kinds of models seem to 
propose an anachronistic view of mind, in which the two 
systems seem to work in an antagonist way. Within the 
more recent dual-processing models – that here we will 
name integrated models – a number of cognitive scientists 
have proposed a different notion of rationality. In spite of 
the differences among models, the common effort is to offer 
an authentic redefinition of the notion of rationality based 
on the integration between distinct inferential processes. In 
this view, rationality is a product of  coordination or 
integration more than a product of competition or conflict in 
which a more rational system (the System 2) needs to win 
over another one (the System 1) (see Baumard & Boyer, 
2013; Carruthers, 2011; Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012; 
Moshman, 2004, Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
Mercier and Sperber (2011) propose one of the most 
interesting integrated model of reasoning, the argumentative 
theory of reasoning. Within the wider context of the 
evolution of human communication, they identify the 
function of reasoning in the production and evaluation of 
arguments in communication. The authors describe an 
impressive array of evidence to show that many biases or 
error of reasoning are less puzzling when analysed by 
considering reasoning as an argumentation instrument in 
social dynamics. For example, the confirmation bias 
(people’s tendency to rationalize their prior decisions) is 
seen as a natural and incisive strategy within a perspective 
that considers persuasion as the final outcome of reasoning: 
if people are trying to convince others they must look for 
arguments and evidence to support their prior beliefs and 
decisions. When people are in equalitarian groups and they 
are aptly stimulated, the performance in the production of 
arguments and (above all) in the evaluation of arguments is 
quite good. To explain the cognitive nature of human 
argumentative ability, Mercier and Sperber (2011) start 
from the distinction between intuitive and reflective beliefs 
(Sperber, 1997) and explain the nature of reflective beliefs 
by speculating about the evolution of a specific intuitive 
inferential mechanism: 
 
What characterizes reasoning proper [the ability to reflecting on reasons 
to accept own beliefs] is indeed the awareness not just of a conclusion but 
of an argument that justifies accepting that conclusion. We suggest, 
however, that arguments exploited in reasoning are the output of an 
intuitive inferential mechanism. Like all other inferential mechanisms, its 
processes are unconscious and its conclusions are intuitive. However, these 
intuitive conclusions are about arguments; that is, about representations of 
relationships between premises and conclusions (ivi, p. 58). 
 
What this quote clarifies is that processing of the 
argument is not an outcome of a cognitive mechanism of a 
radical different kind; that is, reasoning is not a question of 
prevailing over one’s own intuitions, but of arguments that – 
also if they have an intuitive nature – need to be produced 
and evaluated. The shift proposed by Mercier and Sperber 
(2011) from an epistemic function to an argumentative 
function of reasoning has other important implications, 
many of which go beyond our scope in this proposal. What 
we would like to underline now is how and why the 
argumentative theory of reasoning might be extended to 
include metaphors and emotions.  
While Mercier and Sperber emphasize the importance of 
argumentation to modify beliefs and decisions, they are not 
interested in identifying the underlying specific cognitive 
factors. There is a wide literature on the fundamental role of 
metaphors and emotions in persuasion and argumentation 
(e.g. Ervas & Ledda, 2014; Macagno & Walton, 2014), 
therefore we should expect a major consideration of these 
mental processes also within the framework of the 
argumentative theory of reasoning. This actual shortcoming 
can be due to a number of reasons, among which a sort of 
“cognitive prejudice” surviving even in models embracing 
the embodied cognition framework. In other words, it seems 
that even though (intuitive, unawareness, automatic) 
cognitive, embodied processes have a role in human 
rationality, they have no positive role in the sensu stricto 
reasoning (especially within normative domains, such as 
moral and political reasoning). Against this long-lasting 
prejudice, we propose a preliminary attempt to outline a 
positive role for emotions and metaphors in reasoning. 
Emotions and Metaphors as Framing 
Strategies 
We aim at understanding reasoning as an argumentation 
process in a model where emotions and metaphors are 
included. From a theoretical point of view, this goal can be 
obtained by integrating the argumentative theory of 
reasoning proposed by Mercier & Sperber (2011) with some 
suggestions on emotions and metaphors coming from the 
theory of logical argumentation (Walton, 2013; Walton, 
Reed & Macagno, 2008). Both emotions and metaphors are 
indeed cognitive processes of framing and reframing, or, in 
other words, processes which can redirect and intensify 
attitudes. 
As to what concerns emotions, they are cognitive 
processes used to represent the positive and negative 
valence of things and actions in the world. What is 
important here is that the attribution of the positive or 
negative valence depends on the perspective of the subject 
who has the emotion and not from the object of the world – 
that is effectively marked as positive or negative. Emotions 
can play such a role because of their strong evaluative 
dimension: they assign a positive or negative marking to 
some features (of objects or events) which might be  
important for organisms from a biological-evolutionary 
perspective (Damasio, 1994). Because of their automatic, 
unconscious and obliged character, emotional processes are 
not backwards but necessary to define the rationality of 
actions (Rossi, 2013). From an evolutionary point of view, 
the automatic, unconscious and obliged character of 
emotional processes are extremely important: they allow for 
quick action without extensive thinking. In this sense, an 
escape reaction in case of fright, or an attack reaction in 
case of anger, are relevant examples for evolutionary 
rationality (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Evans, 2002; Le 
Doux, 1996; Plutchik, 1994).  
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In the same vein, metaphors are powerful devices of 
framing and reframing. Frames are cognitive shortcuts that 
we use to interpret the world around us, to represent the 
world to others, to reason about it and to make decisions 
having an impact on it. When we categorize a phenomenon 
in a frame, we give meaning to some aspects of what is 
observed, and at the same time we discount other aspects 
that are (or become) less relevant. Thus, frames provide 
meaning through a selective process, which filters people's 
perceptions and concepts, providing a specific perspective 
on a problem. 
Communication plays an important role in this process: 
language use sets a frame in which word and concepts 
cluster together defining meanings, associations, 
appropriateness, binding etc. In this process metaphors play 
a central role. For instance, the conceptual metaphor of war 
dictates the use of words like victory, defeat, commitment, 
sacrifice, heroes, casualties, objectives, troops, 
commitments, allies, enemy in the target domain (for 
example in the scientific debate: “to defend a theory”; “to 
attack an approach”). George Lakoff (2002) analysed the 
reframing effect of conceptual metaphors in US politics, in 
particular in identifying the different metaphors and frames 
selected by conservatives and liberals. Just to  give an 
example, in the Unites States while conservatives tend to 
think US in Strict Father terms (e.g. "Washington knows 
best" identifying Washington - metonymy of the nation - as 
the father), liberals tend to think them in terms of the 
Nurturant Parent model, which represents a different 
morally-based family metaphor (e.g. “We need to use our 
influence to have countries in Africa come together”). From 
a theoretical point of view: "Because metaphors in language 
are reflections of metaphorical thought that structures 
reasoning, and thus our actions, both in everyday life and in 
politics, they are rarely isolated. They usually come as part 
of a coherent system of concepts — usually a moral system" 
(Lakoff 2013; Kahneman & Renshon, 2007). This system is 
not necessarily conscious. Nevertheless they are real forms 
of thought, they occur naturally, and they are inescapable: 
 no matter how slow or conscious or logically we think 
about something, we will use metaphors and scenarios that 
are part of the frame we accepted in some way. 
The negative role of emotions and metaphors in 
reasoning and argumentation 
By referring to the notions of framing and reframing, we do 
not mean that emotions and metaphors always have a 
positive role in reasoning and argumentation. As framing is 
a rhetorical strategy, it could be interpreted as a sort of 
manipulation. especially within the Western philosophical 
tradition on the notions of reasoning, argumentation and 
deliberation.. 
In this perspective, the notion of deliberation has been 
defined as a critical use of reason in judgment, reasoning 
and argumentation, in contrast with respect to emotions. 
Indeed, the dominant model of deliberation is a rationalist 
model. In this framework, emotions indisputably have a 
negative role – if they play a role at all – which is alternative 
with respect to the rational option guaranteed by 
justification (Rossi, 2014). First, as to the universality 
requirement, emotions have – by definition – a partial value; 
they safeguard prospective, subjective and temporary 
interests. Second, as to the critical use of reason or, in other 
terms, to the controlled and conscious use of justification, 
the functioning of emotional processes is widely automatic, 
unconscious and obliged (Rossi, 2013). 
The point here is that the unique relevant knowledge at 
the normative level seems to be knowledge that can be 
properly justified. For example, if voter choices are based 
on habits or routine decisions – if people prefer a partisan 
choice as opposed to an accurate evaluation of the effective 
candidate’s merits or of their ideological convictions – then 
it is easy to argue that those emotional choices do not count 
as relevant instances of deliberation choice. In this sense, 
especially in moral and political domains, emotions seem to 
operate besides the domain of rational deliberation anyway. 
Similarly, metaphors might play a negative role in 
argumentation: by exacerbating problems of ambiguity, 
metaphors can indeed contribute to fallacies of reasoning. 
An example is the way US foreign policy has used the 
NATION AS PERSON metaphor to justify wars. Lakoff 
(2003) especially shows how it has been used in the Iraq 
conflict, among other wars. This central metaphor in US 
foreign policy triggered the conceptualization of Iraq as a 
single person: Saddam Hussein. As a consequence, 
American citizens tend to think that Iraq war is against only 
him: therefore the metaphor hides that the 3000 bombs in 
two days have killed many thousands of people and not just 
an individual. A preliminary study on the role of metaphors 
in quaternio terminorum comprehension shows that the 
majority of sentences with dead metaphors (83%) are 
perceived as true, even though they are literally false (Ervas, 
Gola, Ledda & Sergioli, 2012). 
a) “George Clooney is a star”  
a.1 famous actor 
a.2 celestial body 
Metaphors are, at a linguistic level, words with multiple 
meanings, as in the case of "grasp", which can mean: hold 
on, but also apprehend, understand and grip. All these 
meanings are lexicalized, so we do not perceive them as 
“pregnant metaphorical uses” (Black, 1993, p. 25). They 
rather are conventionalized uses, that scholars call 
“lexicalized metaphors” or “dead metaphors”. They are part 
of our conceptual maps and we find them in dictionaries. 
Participants assign them the intuitive truth-conditions, 
respecting speakers’ semantic intuitions: understanding a 
statement means knowing the concrete circumstances of its 
truth (Carston, 2002).
 The “falsehood” of dead metaphors is 
then seen as a “myth” (Scheffler, 1988) and as a tendency to 
judge metaphor with some kind of truth conditions, the 
literal ones, which cannot explain the very nature of 
metaphor itself (Clark, 1994). 
However, in argumentation, the evaluation of the 
premises’ truth conditions influences the overall 
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comprehension of the correctness of the whole argument 
(Ervas & Ledda, 2014). Therefore, dead metaphors easily 
elicit fallacies of reasoning and engender a highly 
persuasive argumentation, as long as we consider the 
classical theory of argumentation. 
A chance for (some) emotions and the creativity of 
(some) metaphors 
However we cannot refer to emotions and metaphors 
without specifying the kind of emotions and metaphors we 
are dealing with: emotions and metaphors are not all of the 
same kind. To better discuss this point, let us briefly return 
to the argumentative theory of reasoning. This theory has 
recently been applied in moral and political domains 
(Landemore & Mercier, 2012; Mercier, 2011). In particular, 
Mercier (2011) has stressed the close connection between 
this theory and Haidt’s intuitionist theory of moral judgment 
stating that «this view can be seen as a refinement of Haidt’s 
social intuitionist model that puts more stress on persuasion 
and claims that moral arguments – and not only narratives 
or appeal to emotions – can play an important role in 
changing our moral judgments and decisions» (ivi, p. 132). 
At first sight, it seems somewhat complex to include 
emotions in the characterization of moral arguments: the 
persuasion that Mercier (2011) refers to is thought be on the 
opposite side with respect to emotions thus implying that 
argumentation and emotional processing are in fact distinct 
modes of thinking of human mind. In opposition with this 
conclusion, our aim is to try to understand reasoning as an 
argumentation process and emotions within an integrative 
model. 
The theoretical load – as the above quotation by Mercier 
(2011) makes clear – rests on the notion of moral argument 
or, in very general terms, on the notion of argument. More 
specifically, the capacity to evaluate arguments with 
different persuasive strength is a key capacity within an 
argumentative theory of reasoning. From our perspective, 
the interesting question is what kind of arguments – relevant 
from a cognitive point of view – have an effect in moral and 
political human activities. We suppose that different kinds 
of arguments might have a positive role in reasoning and 
thus emotive arguments might be located between them.  
While within a classical argumentation theory Macagno 
& Walton (2014) attempt to reconsider the role of emotive 
language in ordinary and political discourse, our main aim is 
to emphasise the cognitive relevance of emotions in 
reasoning. What is relevant here is the evaluative nature of 
emotional processes (Rossi, 2013). Each emotional reaction, 
even though it is automatic and unconscious, signals to the 
organism that there is some change in the physical or social 
environment that is demanding attention. Within this 
theoretical context, the theory of Affective Intelligence 
proposed by Marcus (2000, 2002; MacKuen et al., 2010) 
can be considered as an initial attempt to positively consider 
the evaluation nature of (some) emotions within an 
integrated model of political deliberation. Marcus et al. 
(2000) propose a dual-processing model by distinguishing 
two different systems: the disposition system (or habit 
execution system) and the surveillance system. When 
people devote attention to an issue guided by the disposition 
system, they usually generate arguments by adopting a 
defensive search for information to support their prior 
beliefs but when people devote attention to an issue guided 
by the surveillance system, they are more than likely to 
generate arguments by adopting an exploratory search for 
information – to bear in mind other alternative viewpoints 
and (in some cases) to try to achieve a compromise 
(MacKuen et al., 2010). In this distinction between a 
defensive search and an exploratory search for information, 
we perceive a first important conceptual distinction made 
more explicit with respect to the model depicted by Mercier 
and Sperber (2011). Might it be a difference between a 
persuasive argumentation (also recognized by Mercier and 
Sperber), and a more reflective argumentation with which 
people try to call into question their own prior beliefs and 
decisions
1
. While Mercier and Sperber (2011) also 
emphasise the importance of argumentation to modify 
beliefs and decisions, they are not interested in 
distinguishing which cognitive factors are necessary for the 
two kinds of argumentation. What makes Marcus’ model 
very interesting is the hypothesis that different emotions 
might be a different role in reasoning, stimulating 
persuasive argumentation or reflective argumentation. 
Emotions such as anger, disgust, enthusiasm and aversion 
seem to be correlated with people’s preference for a 
selective exposure to information. These emotions prepare 
people for a defensive reaction that seems to block them to 
bear in mind different point of views. On the contrary, other 
negative emotions, such as anxious reactions, seem to 
involve a more explorative search for information thus 
recognising to the emotion of anxiety a role relating to the 
management of changes in the political or economic 
environments. This hypothesis is consistent with analogous 
results within the literature on the role of affects and 
emotions in cognition in which there is an attempt to show 
that discrete emotions have a different influence on 
judgment and decision-making (for a review of the literature 
see Angie et al.; 2011). Finally, Marcus’ model represents 
an initial attempt to integrate emotion and rationality by 
identifying a different role (generally deliberative) for 
distinct emotions. 
Something similar can be said about metaphors: the 
evidence for the negative role of dead metaphors we 
discussed in the previous section is different from the 
evidence for the role of live metaphors. While the majority 
of sentences with dead metaphors (83%) are perceived as 
true, the majority of sentences with live metaphors (79%) 
are instead perceived as literally false, even though they are 
non-literally true. 
b) “Africa is a tapestry” 
b. 1 the continent 
                                                          
1
 Marcus and colleagues refer to partisan citizenship and 
deliberative citizenship to distinguish these two different modes 
used by people to search for information. 
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b. 2 artistic composition of pieces 
However, an alternative, “imaginative” route is 
hypothesized (Carston, 2010; Carston & Wearing, 2011): 
the literal meaning would be maintained in a global 
pragmatic process resulting in a range of communicated 
affective and imagistic effects: “images are not 
communicated but are activated or evoked when certain 
lexical concepts are accessed and may be further 
imaginatively developed (by, for instance, shifting mental 
focus or perspective, zooming in on detail, or forming a 
connected dynamic sequence) as the conceptual content of 
the utterance is recovered” (Carston, 2010, p. 319). Live 
metaphors thus engender a more reflective argumentation, 
as long as they force to find alternative interpretations to 
make sense of speakers’ utterances. 
Therefore, live metaphors are highly creative and could 
have a positive role in reasoning, as the history of science 
testifies. As several studies have shown (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; Black, 1962), metaphors are essential not only 
because of their communicative and pedagogical functions, 
but also (and more interestingly) because of their epistemic 
role. Metaphor is indeed a powerful device to increase our 
knowledge, because it enhances the connections between 
human thought and reality (Gola, 2005). 
In everyday reasoning, which makes use of natural 
language, metaphors are not only frequent, but also useful: 
they allow people to understand each other and negotiating 
meanings in concrete contexts. Indeed, in metaphors, we 
contemporarily activate two different domains: the source 
and the target domains. The source domain, usually more 
concrete and/or better known, works as ground to 
understand the target domain, through a number of implicit 
inferences that keep the same structure between the two 
domains. Black (1954), in its interactive view of metaphor, 
highlighted that metaphors are irreducible to a literal 
paraphrase, because it would inevitably say «too much and 
with the wrong emphasis» (ivi, p. 293). Furthermore he 
underlined that «the relevant weakness of the literal 
paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or 
boringly explicit or deficient in qualities of style; it fails to 
be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the 
metaphor did» (ivi, p. 293). 
“Live metaphors” are new and creative uses of language, 
not referable to a frequent use of language (and already 
classified in dictionaries). Metaphors have been considered 
in connection with polysemy in cognitive semantics («the 
conceptual metaphor explains the systematicity of the 
polysemy» Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 248), but also in 
other perspectives, in which metaphors have been 
considered the most important ways to create new meanings 
(Bartsch, 2002). In Lakoff and Johnson’s view, live 
metaphors are a creative way of realising a conceptual 
metaphor. They are also supposed to be as much alive as the 
conventional and vital conceptual metaphors in which they 
are considered grounded. For example, the structure of the 
LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor gives rise to 
many conventionalized meanings, as “I do not know which 
path to take,” but also unconventional, poetic utterances like 
the verses of Robert Frost’s poetry “The Road Not Taken” 
(1920). Lakoff and Turner (1989) showed many similar 
examples, maintaining that «great poets can speak to us 
because they use the modes of thought we all possess» and 
that «to understand the nature and value of poetic creativity 
requires us to understand the ordinary ways we think» (ivi, 
pp. xi-xii). 
Conclusion 
By integrating the argumentative theory of reasoning 
proposed by Mercier and Sperber (2011) within the broader 
context of argumentation theory – in an interdisciplinary 
field at the crossroad of argumentative, logic, linguistic and 
psychological disciplines – we proposed a preliminary 
tentative extension of the argumentative theory of reasoning 
in order to acknowledge a positive role for (some) emotions 
and (some) metaphors. Claiming that both these mental 
processes involve framing strategies is a significant step to 
reach this goal. Further theoretical and empirical research is 
required to clarify, within a unified approach, the hows and 
whys emotions and metaphors have a role in argumentation. 
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modello «antagonistico». Sistemi Intelligenti, 1, pp. 149-
160. 
Mercier, H. (2011). What good is moral reasoning?. Mind & 
Society, 10, pp. 131-148. 
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? 
Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and 
Brian Sciences, 34, pp. 57-111. 
Moshman, D. (2004). From inference to reasoning: The 
construction of rationality. Educational Psychology 
Papers and Publications, Paper 44, 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/44. 
Plutchik, R. (1994). The Psychology and Biology of 
Emotion. New York: HarperCollins. 
Rossi, M.G. (2013). Il giudizio del sentimento. Emozioni, 
giudizi morali, natura umana. Roma: Editori Riuniti 
University Press. 
Rossi, M.G. (2014). Emozioni e deliberazione razionale. 
Sistemi Intelligenti, 1, pp. 161-170. 
Scheffler, I. (1988). Ten Myths of Metaphor. Journal of 
Aesthetic Education, 22 (1), pp. 45–50. 
Sperber, D. (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind 
and Language, 12, pp. 67-83. 
Stanovich K., & West, R. (2000). Individual differences in 
reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, pp. 645-726. 
Walton, D. (2013). Methods of argumentation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Walton, D., & Macagno, F. (2015). The Importance and 
Trickiness of Definition Strategies in Legal and Political 
Argumentation. Journal of Politics and Law, 8, pp. 137-
148. 
Walton, D., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). 
Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
650
